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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Islamic finance has been developed as an alternative to and a radical departure from conventional 
finance, enabling its practitioners and customers to follow the commandments of God as 
revealed in the Sharia. We first present a concise overview of the aims and claims of Islamic 
finance. Next we review the strong and weak points of Islamic finance compared with 
conventional finance. We continue with the question whether  Islamic finance fulfils its promise 
to provide a viable and credible Sharia-compliant alternative to conventional finance. Before 
giving a final verdict we discuss the tensions inherent to Islamic finance. All the time, it must be 
kept in mind that any assessment of Islamic finance can only be of a tentative character, as the 
Islamic finance industry is still relatively young and in a developmental stage. 
 
2. AIMS AND CLAIMS 
 
2.1 The Aims of Islamic Finance 
 
Islamic Finance aims to follow the precepts of the Sharia. This includes a number of injunctions: 
(i) First and foremost the ban on riba must be observed. It is a moot point whether riba  should 
be seen as identical with our present-day forms of interest (Visser 2009 p. 32), but most of the 
leading fuqaha or fiqh scholars (specialists in Islamic jurisprudence) are adamant it is. 
(ii) Then, maysir and gharar are prohibited. Maysir is speculation and gharar is risk or 
uncertainty, carrying the connotation of deception and illusion. The prohibition of gharar is at the 
heart of Islamic contract law. It implies that (a) both the subject and prices of the sale exist and 
parties are able to deliver, (b) the characteristics and the amounts of the countervalues are 
specified and (c) the quantity, quality and date of future delivery, if any, are defined. 
(iii) Muslims should steer clear of a number of products and services that are forbidden, haram, 
or declared forbidden. The list includes alcoholic drinks, pork-related products, adult 
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entertainment and gambling. In general, the Islamic finance industry furthermore tends to follow 
Maulana Maududi (1903-1979), the father of the idea of an Islamic economy and of Islamic 
finance, and other strict conservatives, first of all the Wahabite sect, in rejecting music (Maududi 
1999 p. 31, Slomp 2007 pp. 47-51). Weaponry is generally, though not universally, excluded as 
well. 
 
An important corollary of the prohibition of gharar and maysir is that conventional insurance 
cannot be permitted. Under conventional insurance, an amount of money, the insurance 
premium, is paid but it is not known beforehand what will be received in return. Possibly 
nothing, possibly a large sum of money. Paying money in return for a reduction in risk or 
uncertainty is not deemed acceptable. Another corollary is that forward and future contracts are 
generally seen as incompatible with the Sharia.
24
 One cannot sell what one does not yet possess, 
as future delivery would not be assured. An exception is made for agricultural products, and 
often the exception is generalised to include fungible manufactured goods.
 25
 But baiʼsalam, the 
shariah-compliant forward contract, differs from conventional forwards and futures in that, first, 
the full price of the product must be paid in advance (baiʼsalam means prepaid purchase) and, 
second, that at maturity the buyer must actually take delivery of the goods.  
 
Apart from the stipulations on gharar and maysir, there are other peculiarities of Islamic contract 
law that must be taken account of. A particularly important one is that 
(iv) a contract should not cover more than one transaction. A sales transaction and a lease 
agreement, for instance, cannot be combined in one contract.  
 
Finally, Muslim creditors are under an obligation to show leniency towards debtors who are 
unable to make repayments. Quran 2:280 says ‘If the debtor is in a difficulty, grant him time till 
it is easy for him to repay; but if you waive the sum by way of charity it will be better for 
you, if you understand it’ (Quran 2004).  
 
                                                          
24
 Forwards are contracts for future delivery concluded directly between buyer and seller, futures are standardized 
contracts for future delivery traded on an exchange. 
25
 Goods with interchangeable individual units; buyers do not order a specific individual unit and it is immaterial to 
the buyer which one is delivered. 
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2.2 The Claims of Islamic Finance 
 
Islamic finance claims to follow the precepts of the Sharia. These rule all aspects of a Muslim’s 
life. Earning an income by one’s own labour is excellent and private ownership is fine, but man 
should earn his income and manage his possessions as God’s steward or vice-regent, khalifah 
(El-Ashker and Wilson 2006 pp. 38-9). Ownership is never absolute, there are no rights without 
obligations, in particular the obligation of social justice (Lewis 2011). Other people may not be 
exploited or cheated. It is deemed unfair if a lender receives a fixed return irrespective of the 
outcome of the borrower’s business venture for instance. Interest payments dupe the poor and 
worsen income inequality. The lender should share in the risks of that business. Profit sharing 
and profit-and-loss sharing are thus the ideals of Islamic finance ( both will be denoted by PLS 
below). It is claimed that following the Sharia in this respect brings many benefits. The ban on 
interest payments sees to it that there are few financial transactions independent of goods 
transactions, which helps to contain speculative activities. The global financial crisis is seen as 
the consequence of conventional finance not following the ethical principles of Islam (Leins 
2010). 
 
 
3. STRONG AND WEAK POINTS 
 
3.1 Strong Points 
 
Compared with conventional finance, Islamic finance has (potential) strong points and weak 
points. We start out with the potential strong points. 
 
(i). Lower danger of insolvency because of the absence of interest rate risk. Under PLS, if 
strictly applied, fluctuations in a firm’s income are passed on to financiers or creditors, including 
a bank’s depositors, in the form of profit sharing. This should reduce the danger of insolvency. 
PLS financing, however, is generally only a minor part of an Islamic bank’s asset portfolio (for 
reasons that will be made clear in the next section). Iqbal estimated that in the mid-1990s PLS 
financing made up no more than 15% of Islamic bank financing (Iqbal 1997 p. 40). Recent 
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figures suggest that things have not changed much in the meantime. At the end of 2009, the share 
of PLS financing in outstanding financing and advances of one of the leading Islamic banks, 
HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad, was no more than a paltry 1.4% (HSBC 2010). The 
corresponding, and perhaps more typical, figure for Albaraka Bank (Pakistan) was 16.4% at the 
end of 2011 (Albaraka 2012).
26
  
 
Moreover, banks do not always pass losses on to holders of PLS accounts. Quite often there is an 
implicit promise of some minimal return on deposits, or a de facto guarantee of nonnegative 
returns. The bank may in that case suffer losses after all and face the danger of insolvency. 
Indeed, there are indications that returns on PLS accounts in Islamic banks often follow interest 
rates on conventional bank deposits (Cevik and Charap 2011). This probably reflects the fear that 
customers might defect to conventional banks if returns are disappointing.  
 
The upshot is that the practice of Islamic banking is far removed from the ideal of PLS on both 
the assets side and the liabilities side of the balance sheet, and thus from the claimed benefits of 
PLS. 
 
(ii). Protection against financial crises. Even if PLS is not dominant in Islamic banking, it can be 
argued that the industry is less prone to the excesses that have led to the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis than the conventional banking sector. As credit transactions must be both interest-free and, 
in principle, be associated with goods transactions, Islamic banks are less free to engage in large-
scale borrowing on money and capital markets than their conventional colleagues. Furthermore, 
they cannot freely invest in risky derivatives, in contrast to conventional financial institutions, 
because these generally are tainted with interest and in conflict with the other Islamic 
requirements for forward contracts.  
 
Empirical research is scarce, but the available evidence suggests that Islamic banks do not differ 
substantially from conventional banks in their business model as measured by the share of fee-
based to total income or share of non-deposits in total funding. Their capital-asset ratios, 
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do not always provide a relevant breakdown in their financial statements.  
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however, are higher, as are their liquidity ratios. This, argue Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Merrouche (2010), explains their better performance during the crisis. High capital-asset ratios 
are helped by the obstacles to large-scale borrowing, especially short-term, facing Islamic banks 
and high liquidity ratios may result from the underdeveloped Islamic interbank money market, as 
the opportunities to invest liquid assets on an interest-free basis are restricted. A negative factor 
was relatively poor risk management. This may be due to the relatively small size of Islamic 
banks, but also to the underdeveloped Islamic financial markets. Furthermore, even if Islamic 
banks do not indulge in risky interest-related activities, they still are exposed to credit risk. 
Islamic financial institutions, and other Islamic investors for that matter, had their share of 
trouble following the collapse of real-estate prices in large parts of the globe, including the 
Middle East. Nevertheless, Islamic banks performed on average better than conventional banks 
in the wake of the crisis, but against that Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Merrouche found that returns 
on shares of Islamic banks over longer periods were lower than those on conventional bank 
shares. A similar picture is painted by the literature on the yields on Islamic investment funds 
(Hakim and Rashidian 2004; Girard and Hassan 2006; Hoepner, Rammal and Razek 2009. 
 
(iii). Increase of participation in the official financial system. There are many Muslims who 
could not bring themselves to enter a conventional bank’s office and make use of the bank’s 
services. If an Islamic bank sets up shop in their neighbourhood, the fact that it is Islamic might 
be just the incentive they need to enter the world of formal finance (Demir et al. 2004). In this 
way Islamic banks contribute to a higher degree of financial intermediation, which 
both economic theory and empirical research say generally fosters economic development (Ang 
2008). Islamic investment funds may fulfil a similar role. These also offer an alternative for 
some non-Muslims seeking ethical investment opportunities, even though the wholesale rejection 
of the amusement industry, to name one characteristic, might strike some as overly strict. 
 
3.2 Weak points 
 
The basic idea underlying economics is that there is no such thing as a free lunch. This applies 
also to Islamic finance. What can be seen as its weak points?  
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(i). A shift of risks from shareholders to depositors. If PLS principles, strictly applied, reduce the 
danger of insolvency for banks, the flip side of the coin is that depositors run a higher risk. A 
strict application of PLS principles would shift the risk of losses from shareholders to depositors 
but  depositors do not have the rights of shareholders. In particular, they are not in a position to 
replace managers. As returns to depositors in actual practice do not fluctuate in step with an 
Islamic bank’s earnings, this objection to Islamic finance loses much of its force. Moreover, 
alternatives to deposits are becoming available. Sukuk, Islamic certificates, for instance, offer 
investors a return linked to LIBOR. Though sukuk are mainly aimed at institutional investors, the 
Securities Commission Malaysia is taking measures to make them more attractive to retail 
investors, first of all by facilitating the issuance of sukuk of a relatively low denomination. 
(ii). Higher transaction costs. Islamic contract law stipulates that each transaction requires a 
separate contract, which makes for higher costs (El-Gamal 2006 pp. 1, 6, 12; van Duyn 2010). 
This is very clear if we look at the most widely used Islamic bank financing contract, the 
murabaha or mark-up sale. Under a murabaha sale a bank buys a good for his own account, but 
at the behest of a customer, and sells it to the customer with a mark-up, usually against deferred 
payment. The bank, or any other intermediary, is obliged to assume formal ownership for some 
period of time, however short, and carry the risk of loss or damage. This brings increased costs 
with it, on top of the added complications of having to deal with two separate contracts and 
possibly complications in the tax sphere or a negative attitude of supervisory authorities with 
regard to banks acting as traders.  
 
Furthermore, the requirement that financial transactions are linked to goods transactions may 
result in circuitous ways to provide a loan. The tawarruq contract popular in de Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, for instance, involves the purchase of a good by a bank 
on behalf of its customer that may be paid in instalments, followed by a sale to a third party 
against immediate payment.
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(iii). Principal–agent problems. Under PLS finance, Islamic banks are less well equipped than 
conventional banks to deal with principal–agent problems. Under PLS finance, there is a higher 
moral-hazard risk than under conventional interest-based finance. Moral hazard is the risk that 
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debtors act in a way detrimental to the interests of the creditor. First, the financier and the firm 
seeking funding must agree on an accounting rule to determine profits if profits or profits and 
losses are to be shared. Second, the firm has an incentive to cook the books as it has an interest in 
showing low profits. Third, whereas under conventional loans the borrowing firm first must pay 
interest to the financier before anything is left for the owners (the entrepreneur or the 
shareholders), under PLS even a low return on invested funds leaves something for the firm’s 
owners or managers and this may lead them to take it easy or spend more on such things as 
luxurious business trips or expensive office furnishings. PLS therefore requires close monitoring 
of the customer by the financier, which is costly. These are serious problems and consequently 
PLS finance takes only a small slice of the Islamic finance market. The principal-agent problems 
are therefore not so much solved as circumvented.  
 
(iv). Insurance. Islamic financial products include insurance. Conventional insurance is not 
deemed acceptable, not only because it is closely connected with investment in interest-earning 
assets but also because conventional insurance involves gharar and maysir, as we have seen 
above. The Islamic solution, takaful, is in contrast claimed to be based on brotherhood. Takaful 
is a mutual fund where participants contribute to a kitty from which participants who meet with 
adversity receive a compensation. The kitty usually is managed by a commercial firm. Any 
profits may be distributed after the end of the book year, which may prevent the building up of 
reserves. In case of high claims during any book year this may leave claimants with less than full 
compensation of damages. If reserves are insufficient the managing firm may provide credit 
facilities, but policy holders or participants cannot take this for granted and may be in for 
unpleasant surprises. 
 
(v). Fewer opportunity for hedging risks. A ban on forward contracts and other derivatives may 
reduce speculation and add to the stability of the financial system, but it also reduces the 
opportunities to hedge risks or optimize the risk–return profile of a wealth portfolio. With less 
scope for hedging, the supply of funds for high-risk, high-return projects may be affected, and 
with it possibly economic growth. 
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(vi). Legal uncertainties. Border-crossing Islamic finance deals are often governed by English 
law, but if the underlying assets are located in Middle Eastern countries, enforceability of the 
contracts may become a problem. This problem, however, is not peculiar to Islamic finance but 
inherent to any contract with these countries. With Islamic contracts may come another risk, so-
called sharia risk. There are no uniform standards determining which financial instruments are 
sharia-compliant and which are not, though a couple of standard-setting bodies, first of all the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), with its seat 
in Bahrain, attempt to bring harmonization. The AAOIFI’s standards, however, have not been 
universally adopted and are only mandatory in a few countries: Bahrain, Malaysia, UAE, Saudi 
Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Sudan and Jordan. Parties to a contract that are unable or unwilling to 
fulfil their obligations may consequently see room to claim that the contract was void because it 
was not sharia-compliant after all. A couple of such cases have been brought before English 
courts (Moody’s 2010). In retail banking or in general the usual bank – customer relationships, 
where standard contracts dominate, such problems are less likely to arise than in wholesale 
transactions. 
 
4. DOES ISLAMIC FINANCE FULFIL ITS PROMISE?  
 
Islamic finance aims to provide a sharia-compliant alternative to conventional finance that does 
not suffer from the defects of conventional finance. Does it succeed?  
 
The ethics of Islamic finance mainly imply following the sharia-based bans enumerated in 
Section 2.1 above. The ideals of brotherhood touted by proponents of Islamic finance appear 
hard to put into practice; it occurs probably mainly in the form of zakat (Islamic charity) 
contributions and, on a small scale, qard hasan (beneficence) loans, loans against at most a very 
small administrative fee for the benefit of the less well-of. Qard hasan loans, however, play an 
insignificant role in the average Islamic bank’s activities. Albaraka Bank (Pakistan), for instance, 
only has a very small amount of qarz-e-hasna loans, as they are called in Pakistan, on its balance 
sheet: 0.06% of total domestic advances. And these, moreover, are not for the benefit of the poor, 
the entry instead ‘represents mark-up free financings to staff advanced under the Bank’s human 
resource policies’ (Albaraka 2012). In HSBC Amanah Malaysia’s qard hasan loans are even 
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punier at 0.01% of the total (HSBC 2010). Furthermore, Islamic banks do not hesitate to finance 
huge building projects in Bahrain, Qatar and Dubai, where conditions for the workers are 
reported to be appalling (Leins 2010). More generally, Islamic financial institutions are not in the 
forefront of sustainability or corporate social responsibility movements. It is not impossible, 
however, that this may change some day. After all, the view that man is God’s vice-regent is not 
different from the Christian notion of stewardship. Indeed, there are some initiatives in this 
direction, however tentative. The CFA Institute, an association of investment professionals that 
promotes high ethical standards, has a division ‘Islamic Finance and Environmental, Social, and 
Governance (ESG) Investing’, for instance (cfainstitute.com; Hayat 2010). 
 
As for the leniency to be shown towards defaulting debtors, the risks, including moral-hazard 
risk, are plainly too high for financiers not to cover against. On the webpage describing its 
Islamic home purchase plans, Ahli United Bank in England displays a warning in capitals that 
‘YOUR HOME IS AT RISK IF YOU DO NOT KEEP UP MONTHLY PAYMENTS ON 
YOUR HOME PURCHASE PLAN’ (http://www.iibu.com/buy_home/buyhome.aspx). That 
means that they will not hesitate to repossess a home in case of payment arrears. Islamic Relief, a 
major charity, requires borrowers in its microfinance projects to provide guarantors who will be 
held responsible for repayment if debtors default (Khan 2008 p. 46). These are not exceptions.  
 
Even on some of the major claims of Islamic finance the record is mixed. Interest may be 
banned, but there is such a demand for income streams that do not fluctuate too much that 
products have been developed that come very close. One of the great success stories of Islamic 
finance is the development of the market for sukuk. These come in various guises; one popular 
form is the sale – lease-back construction. The financier sets up a separate entity, a Special 
Purpose Vehicle, which sells sukuk to investors. The proceeds are used to buy real estate from 
the borrower who then leases the same real estate back. The lease payments are funneled by the 
SPV to the investors. As the lease rate is usually fixed at LIBOR plus a margin, investors receive 
a steady income stream which is very much akin to interest, but formally interest (LIBOR) is 
only a benchmark. Furthermore, the link between financial transactions and goods transactions 
can be reduced to a mere formality. We have already mentioned tawarruq. This can be seen as a 
prevalence of form over substance. An even more glaring case is bai inah, or bai-al-einah, 
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repurchase by the seller. Under a bai inah contract the financier sells a good to the customer 
against deferred payment and buys it immediately back against constant payment. The customer 
need not even see the good in question. It is a circuitous way to obtain a money loan and the link 
with a goods transaction is no more than formal. Bai inah, though not admissible in the Middle 
East, is very popular in Malaysia; it made up 32% of HSBC Amanah Malaysia’s outstanding 
financing and advances at the end of 2009 (HSBC 2010). 
 
5. INTRINSIC TENSIONS  
 
Islamic finance wrestles with tensions between on the one hand principles rooted in revelations 
received by the prophet Muhammad fourteen centuries ago and in ahadith, traditions, from the 
same period or soon after, and on the other hand the needs of present-day financial market 
participants. The principles are held immutable by the great majority of Muslims, first of all the 
Islamic reform movement of which the Islamic finance industry is an offshoot (Visser 2009 
Chapter 1). The fuqaha (fiqh scholars) are fully aware of this tension. Sheikh Muhammad Taqi 
Usmani, a retired judge of the Federal Sharia Court of Pakistan and one of the most sought-after 
members of the sharia boards that have to determine whether the products developed by Islamic 
financial institutions pass muster, acknowledges, for instance, that murabaha is far removed from 
the ideal of PLS, but states that it should ‘be used as a transitory step taken in the process of the 
Islamization of the economy, and its use should be restricted only to those cases where 
mudarabah or musharakah [that is, PLS instruments] are not practicable’ (Usmani n.d.). As 
chairman of the sharia board of the AAOIFI he has taken steps to reduce the similarity between 
sukuk and conventional bonds. In 2008 the AAOIFI sharia board advised sharia boards of 
financial institutions to make sure that ownership of underlying assets was transferred to sukuk 
investors and that it is not permissible for the investment manager (SPV) to undertake to 
repurchase these assets for their nominal value at the end of the maturity of the sukuk (AAOIFI 
2008). Sukuk holders should be subject to some form of market risk and the principal should 
therefore not be guaranteed.  
 
Despite the attempts to bring the practices of the Islamic finance industry more into line with 
Islamic principles as interpreted by the leading fiqh scholars, some prominent Muslim observers 
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are disappointed. Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, a prolific, and profound, writer on Islamic finance, for 
instance sees ‘an Islamic finance movement that is at best an economically inefficient replication 
of the conventional finance for which it purports to be a substitute’ (El-Gamal 2003, p. 17). In 
his eyes Islamic financial instruments are sharia-compliant in form but not in substance. 
Moreover, the Islamic norms observed by the Islamic finance industry are, according to him, 
those of a hopelessly outdated, medieval jurisprudence that also contributes to an unfortunate 
separatist Islamic identity that fans feelings of superiority (El-Gamal 2007). M. Umer Chapra, 
another leading writer on Islamic finance and associated with the Islamic Research and Training 
Institute of the Islamic Development Bank, is also disappointed in the disparity between the 
ideals of Islamic finance and everyday reality. He deplores, in particular, the minor role played 
by equity and PLS modes of finance (Chapra 2007, 2009). Similar concerns have been voiced by 
Mehmet Asutay,  the director of the Durham Centre for Islamic Economics and Finance (IIBI 
Lectures 2012). 
 
There is, thus, a tension which manifests itself in continuous attempts by Islamic financial 
institutions to develop new products, including various forms of derivatives, that meet the needs 
of customers and on the other hand attempts by sharia boards and standard-setting bodies to 
make the industry act in accordance with what they believe should be the norms for an Islamic 
society. It remains to be seen to what extent Islamic finance will be able to find ways to meet the 
needs of their customers without coming even more under the suspicion that they do not much 
more than mimic conventional finance in a complicated way. 
 
6. A FINAL VERDICT 
 
It should not be forgotten that Islamic finance was born from attempts to Islamize society. That 
means that a full-scale substitution of conventional finance by Islamic finance would cut off the 
main sources of external funding for a number of industries whose products most people, 
including many Muslims, would prefer not to do without. It would also hurt the rest of the 
economy, as the range of products offered by Islamic financial institutions is limited and costs 
tend to be higher. Opportunities to hedge risks, for instance, would be severely restricted.   
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The final verdict should be that Islamic finance is a useful addition to the range of financial 
products, catering for the needs of a specific market segment, but falls short of its own ideals and 
offers little that is attractive to non-Muslims. Some non-Muslims may feel attracted by the 
ethical principles underlying Islamic finance, in particular the ban on interest, but for others it 
offers not much more than an opportunity to diversify their portfolios or to profit occasionally 
from the availability of funds at attractive rates (in particular when oil prices are high and a large 
supply of funds from the Middle East is available). To end on a positive note, a flourishing 
Islamic finance sector may help to combat the interconnectedness between financial institutions 
and the uniformity of their business models that were, through the huge scale of the activities of 
these institutions on derivatives markets and their dependence on short-term borrowings, 
important factors in the 2007-2008 financial crisis (though the cooperative banking sector can, 
and to some extent does, have the same beneficial effect, as it is not subject to constant pressure 
from shareholders to maximize shareholder value in the short term and thus should be better able 
to follow prudent policies). In line with this, the conventional banking industry could have learnt 
from the Islamic financial sector that one should preferably be not too dependent on short-term 
borrowing. It chose instead to learn this lesson the hard way. Experience is the best teacher, but 
often also the most expensive one. 
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Objective  
AFF provides a framework for strategic discussions on key issues facing the development 
of Arab financial markets. It does so by linking decision-makers and opinion-formers 
from the public and private sectors - both in the Arab world and their international 
counterparts.  
 
Rationale  
Arab economies are at cross-roads where vital decisions need to be taken on future 
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be met by countries in a variety of ways. AFF seeks to provide a clearing house of ideas 
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Focus  
The three main challenges addressed by the AFF are:  
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where all corporate members are represented. Alderman Sir Gavyn Arthur, a Barrister of 
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An Advisory Board appointed by the Governors’ Board reviews research papers and 
liaises with other groups active in the Focus areas (capital markets, liberalisation and 
Islamic finance). Sir Roger Tomkys KCMG DL, the former Chairman of the Arab British 
Chamber of Commerce is co-chairman together with HE Dr. Abdulla Bishara, vice-
chairman of KIPCO and former Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
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